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Abstract:
The intangible asset theory of foreign direct investment holds that firms expand abroad to garner additional
returns to intangible assets such as proprietary process or product technology or a strong reputation. I
explore Norwegian manufacturing data for evidence that foreign owners are realizing returns to intangible
assets. Foreign owners of Norwegian manufacturing establishments are clustered in industries that rely on
such assets and, within narrowly-defined industries, differ from their domestic counterparts by being larger
and using physical and human capital more intensively. My finding that foreign-owned establishments are
approximately 2% more productive than their domestic counterparts is suspect evidence for the intangible
assets theory because it relies crucially on the accuracy of the estimate of the scale elasticity, and such
estimates are subject to well-known omitted variables and errors-in-variables biases. I show how the
foreign ownership advantage varies with alternative assumptions about economies of scale, and find that
under reasonable assumptions about scale economies it disappears. I conclude that foreign-owned
establishments are larger and more productive, but cannot yet sort out the relationships between size,
foreign-ownership, and productivity. I find that those establishments acquired by foreigners tend to be of
average productivity and above-average size, but find no evidence that acquisition leads to a productivity
improvement. In addition, I find that aggregating rented and owned capital in a capital services measure
does not significantly affect the productivity comparison.
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1. Introduction
Foreign-owned firms play a substantial role in the Norwegian economy and, as in other
industrialized countries, have increased their presence over the past 15 years. The percentage
of Norwegian manufacturing workers employed at establishments under non-Norwegian
control increased from less than 7 percent in 1975 to more than 10 percent in 1989. As
Europe proceeds towards greater integration and as Norway decides to what extent it will
include itself in the process, the motivation for foreign direct investment and the behavior of
foreign-owned firms become still more interesting issues to explore.
Although theories of foreign direct investment are still debated, international economists
seem to have developed a consensus that firms expand abroad to further exploit intangible
assets such as proprietary product or process technology or reputational capital. I search
Norwegian manufacturing data for evidence that foreign owners are motivated by the
prospect of additional returns to such assets. I conduct my search first by developing a broad
overview of foreign control in Norwegian manufacturing, and then by comparing the
characteristics and productivity performance of foreign-owned establishments with their
domestically-owned counterparts.
Improvements in the availability of data and advances in empirical industrial organization
have made comparisons of the productivity performance of domestic and foreign-owned
firms a more promising source of information. I have access to comprehensive
establishment-level data; since the industry-level predictions of the intangible asset hypothesis
can be generated by other theories of multinational behavior, the ability to work at a micro-
level is crucial. The data also allow me to construct and investigate various definitions of
foreign control, and to control for the possibility that foreign-owned or acquired
establishments may use owned and rented capital in different proportions. Recent
developments in empirical industrial organization provide the means to explore the robustness
of my results to different assumptions about technology, returns to scale and competition.
In the following section, I develop the implications of the intangible asset hypothesis for the
productivity comparison between foreign and domestically-owned establishments. I also
present an alternative to the intangible asset hypothesis that yields similar industry-level
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predictions but different micro-level productivity predictions. The discussion is not intended
to provide a summary of the large literature on multinational behavior but, rather, to
emphasize that more micro-level empirical examination of the intangible asset hypothesis is
vital and that productivity comparisons are a useful contribution. In section 3, I present
some preliminary exploration of the importance of foreign control of Norwegian
manufacturing establishments. I use information on foreign holdings of equity in Norwegian
firms to explore definitions of foreign control. I find that foreign owners usually have either
a majority stake or too small a stake to confer any control, comforting information if one is
faced with having to decide whether a 10%, 20%, or 50% stake is "large enough" to establish
control. More secure given this knowledge, I choose a definition and provide an overview of
foreign control in Norwegian manufacturing. In section 4, I focus on comparing the
characteristics and performance of domestic and foreign-controlled establishments. In section
4.1, I examine the size of foreign-controlled establishments relative to their domestically-
controlled counterparts, and the intensity with which they use physical and human capital. In
sections 4.2 and 4.3, I present the productivity model and discuss two measurement
problems, the aggregation of owned and rented capital, and transfer pricing, that may bias the
productivity comparisons. Section 4.3 contains the results of the productivity comparisons,
and an exploratory probit analysis of whether productivity and size affect the probability of
being acquired by foreigners. Section 5 concludes with suggestions for future research.
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2. Foreign Control and Productivity Performance
Most economists who study foreign direct investment (FDI) describe it as an attempt to
extend corporate control as part of international corporate strategy and not as an attempt to
shift capital between countries) In particular, a consensus seems to have developed around
the view that multinationals expand predominantly to exploit the returns to an intangible
asset, such as proprietary technology or reputational capital, in the face of failures in markets
for technology and information. Indeed, trade theorists have begun to incorporate these ideas
in both static and dynamic settings. 2
The "intangible assets" explanation of FDI is appealing partially because it seems to be con-
firmed by simple observation -multinationals tend to cluster in industries that rely heavily on
investments in research and development (R&D) and marketing. Things are not so simple,
of course, since there are alternatives to the intangible asset explanation that predict the same
industries as targets of multinationals. In this section, I discuss the implications of the
intangible asset view for the productivity comparison between foreign and domestically-
owned establishments. To emphasize that productivity comparisons may be useful and that
micro-level data are vital if we are to discriminate between theories of FDI , I also discuss an
alternative explanation of multinational expansion that yields the same industry-level pre-
dictions as the intangible assets theory but predicts that foreign-owned firms need not be, on
average, more productive than domestically-owned firms.
Consider potential foreign and domestic owners bidding for an existing establishment. If the
potential owners' objectives are to maximize expected profits, then foreign firms will outbid
domestic firms if they expect future returns to be larger under their control or if they face a
lower cost of capital. The intangible asset explanation of foreign direct investment takes as
given that it is more costly for foreign firms to establish and operate in a market than
domestic firms, and asserts that if foreign firms are willing to outbid domestic firms despite
these higher costs it is because they expect higher returns. Foreign control yields higher
returns because the foreign firm possesses assets, such as superior product technology,
Graham and Krugman (1991, p.36).
2 See, e.g., Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984), Brainard (1993), and Grossman and Helpman (1992).
3 I follow Graham and Krugman, op.cit., in employing this construct.
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superior marketing, distribution or organizational skills, or an established reputation, that
provide an advantage over domestic rivals. The foreign firm must also perceive an "inter-
nalization advantage" to direct investment, that is, a reason it is better to exploit the asset
within the boundaries of the firm rather than by licensing to a host-country firm. The
internalization advantage may spring from imperfections in the markets for technology or
information. Finally, the foreign firm must perceive a locational advantage, such as the
existence of tariffs, transportation costs, or an advantage to being close to market, that make
direct investment preferable to trade. For my purposes, the important prediction of the
"intangible asset" hypothesis is that the asset is expected to generate lower costs or higher
revenues for foreign-owned firms that should be observable as higher average revenue
productivity. If "the asset" is a greater than average ability to innovate, or put innovations
into practice, this should be reflected in better than average productivity growth.
Foreign firms may also outbid domestic firms if they face a lower cost of capital. Froot and
Stein (1991) suggest that asymmetrical information may lead to FDI by creating differences
in the cost of capital. If lenders have imperfect information about borrower types, borrower
actions, project qualities or outcomes, the agency costs of external financing cause internal
financing to be less costly. In this setting, foreign firms may be willing to engage in projects
with lower expected productivity performance than would domestic firms if they have a
relatively abundant supply of internally-generated funds that allows them to finance the
projects at lower cost than domestic firms. Changes in firms' wealth generated by factors
such as exchange rate changes will produce changes in the demand for foreign investment.
Interestingly, agency costs should be highest in the technology and information-intensive
industries in which the intangible asset hypothesis would predict that foreign direct
investment would be important. Lenders are likely to find obtaining or verifying information
most costly where, for instance, technology is changing rapidly or the influence of reputation
or advertising makes demand difficult to predict. They will be less able to collateralize debt
when borrowers' assets are primarily intangible and firm-specific. And moral hazard
problems will be exacerbated when it is difficult to determine whether, say, lagging in a
technology race is due to chance or to insufficient effort on the borrower's part.
Unfortunately, much of the empirical support for the intangible asset hypothesis relies on
industry-level comparisons. Horst (1972) and Caves (1974), for example, find a positive
relationship between the extent of multinational presence in an industry and industry
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advertising and R&D intensity. Dunning (1973) and others find that multinationals tend to
be more profitable and productive than other firms:4 More recently, empirical tests have been
done with firm-level
 data. Grubaugh (1987) uses linear probability and logit models and
finds that, controlling for industry, the probability of firm becoming multinational increases
with R&D expenditures and diversification. This lends support to the intangible assets
hypothesis.
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Morck and Yeung (1992) use disaggregate stock market
data and an event study approach to test hypotheses about motives for cross-border acquisi-
tions. Harris and Ravenscraft find that wealth gains to target firms tend to be larger for
cross-border acquisitions in R&D intensive industries; they also find a significant role for the
exchange rate and hence, support for Froot and Stein. They do not find a significant inter-
action between industry R&D intensity and the exchange rate. Morck and Yeung find that
wealth gains are larger for acquiring firms with larger R&D expenditures. They control for
industry effects and firm size and, hence, provide somewhat stronger evidence for the
intangible asset theory.
Klette (1991) uses, as do I, the census of Norwegian manufacturing establishments to com-
pare the productivity performance of establishments with different ownership characteristics. 5
He finds that foreign ownership does not affect an establishment's productivity growth rate.
Moreover, Klette finds that, controlling for a change in ownership, changes from foreign to
domestic (and from domestic to foreign) ownership slightly worsen productivity levels in the
three years following the control change. Although this seems to be evidence against the in-
tangible asset hypothesis, the number of observations representing acquired establishments
may be too few, or a three year adjustment period may be too short, to pick up an effect of
foreign ownership on the level of productivity. Klette was interested in a wide range of fac-
tors that may influence productivity and productivity growth, so the question of whether the
presence of intangible assets can be detecting by comparing the productivity performance of
foreign and domestically-controlled establishments remains to be examined in greater detail.
4 Caves (1982) surveys much of the earlier empirical literature on multinationals.
5 Note that although the theories of FDI discussed in this section are theories of firm behavior, I will be using establishment-level
data. As a result, I will be concerned about the pricing of inputs and outputs transferred between establishments within the firm.
I return to this issue in section 4.3.
3. Extent of Foreign Control in Norwegian Manufacturing
3.1. Defining Foreign Control
Since it is not obvious how large a share of equity is needed to exert control of a firm, or
what equity shares signify the intent to exert control, different institutions and researchers use
different working definitions of foreign control. The U.S. Department of Commerce and the
OECD recognize a foreign investment as "direct," and involving control, when a single
foreign investor owns 10% or more of the equity. Certainly, though, a single large
shareholder may not exercise control although it owns 10% or more of equity, and less than
10% may be sufficient to exercise some control. Others use different definitions; when
ownership is concentrated in the hands of a single foreign owner, the threshold percentage
used to define foreign control usually ranges from 10 to 25%, with a tendency to the lower
end of the range. When enterprises have several foreign owners, the threshold percentage is
usually at least 50 and may be closer to 100%. 6
Statistics Norway conducts an annual near-census of Norwegian enterprises with equity that
is owned, wholly or in part, by foreigners. The resulting data, described in more detail in
Appendix A, provide information on the face value of equity, the share of equity held by the
single largest foreign owner, the share of equity held by all foreign owners, and the
distribution of foreign-owned equity among nationality groups.' They allow a degree of
flexibility in defining a proxy for foreign control and, as I will show, suggest that the
potential for misclassifying firms as foreign-controlled when they are not, and vice versa, is
fairly limited.'
Figure 1 represents the distribution of foreign ownership of Norwegian manufacturing
establishments, conditional on there being some recorded foreign ownership. 9 It illustrates
that ownership shares are often either majority shares and clearly intended to establish
6 See Liansheng (1992).
7 See NOS (several years), Credit Market Statistics: Foreign Assets and Liabilities, for summary statistics and some additional
documentation.
8
 Graham and Krugman (1991) and Steckler and Stevens (1991) discuss the identification of foreign-controlled firms, and argue
that the Commerce/OECD definition works well in practice because ownership stakes are usually either very large, clearly
indicating control, or very small. This is precisely what I find for the Norwegian data.
9 Note that the data represented in figures 1 and 2 are organized at the establishment level.
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control, or are too small to confer any control. Thresholds from 10% to 50% and even
higher will, to a large extent, identify the same set of establishments as foreign-owned. The
picture looks much the same if the focus is on the total equity share of all foreign owners.
Interestingly, although throughout my sample period (1974-1989) Norway maintained a
concession law that required foreign owners to undergo examination to obtain a concession if
their equity stake was to exceed 20%, the requirement seems to have little effect; there is no
noticeable concentration just below 20%. b0
Figure 1. Distribution of the Equity Stake of the Single Largest Foreign Owner, 1980
In this paper, I concentrate on the share of equity held by the single largest shareholder since
that seems to provide the smallest scope for misclassification; I will use the terms "foreign-
owned" or "foreign-controlled" when the share held by the largest single foreign owner is
large enough that it appears to indicate control. I have used three thresholds to explore the
sensitivity of results to changes in this definition. Since the choice of a 10, 20 or 50%
10 In 1989 the law was altered such that a concession is required only if the foreign ownership share is to exceed one third of
total equity.
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threshold does not change the classification of most firms (and does not change results
significantly), I present results for the 10% threshold in the body of the paper."
Although the choice of definition of a foreign acquisition may be a more sensitive matter,
most increases in foreign ownership are either small or a jump to majority ownership.
Noticing the concentration of ownership at 8% of total equity (pictured in figure 2), I
defined a foreign acquisition as a jump from less than 8% of equity held by the largest
foreign shareholder to more than 10, 20 or 50%. Since results were not sensitive to the
choice between these three definitions, I present results for the 10% threshold.
Figure 2. Distribution of the Stake of the Single Largest Foreign Owner given that it is Less Than
or Equal to 20 Percent, 1980
11 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest ownership is likely to be less concentrated the larger the firm, since a given share is
obtained only at a higher price and since owners may be risk averse. This negative relationship between size and ownership
concentration is apparent in the credit market data. Ownership may be less concentrated in regulated industries, since regulators
provide subsidized monitoring for shareholders. Ownership may be more concentrated the noisier firms environments, since
rapid change under, say, conditions of rapidly changing technology will make monitoring of managers more difficult and the
payoff to owners maintaining tight control higher. While I have not looked for all these relationships in the data, they suggest
a theoretical reason for focusing on the 10% threshold instead of on higher thresholds, since using higher thresholds may result
in a selection of foreign-owned firms that overrepresents small and/or rapidly growing foreign firms.
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3.2. An Overview of Foreign Control of Norwegian Manufacturing
I linked the information on foreign ownership to information from Statistics Norway's annual
census of manufacturing establishments for 1974-89. 12 This allows me to develop a picture
of foreign control of Norwegian manufacturing establishments, how that picture has changed
over time, and how it varies across industries. 13
Table 1 presents the fraction of establishments controlled by foreign owners and the fraction
of all manufacturing workers employed in foreign-controlled establishments in 1980. As one
reads Table 1 from left to right, the definition of foreign control becomes more inclusive.
Using the 10% threshold, foreign owners controlled just over 3.5 % of manufacturing
establishments and employed nearly 8.5 % of manufacturing workers.
Table 1. Share of Manufacturing Establishments and Employment Controlled by Foreign Owners, 1980
Largest	 Largest	 Largest
Foreign Owner	 Foreign Owner	 Foreign Owner
Holds k 50% of	 Holds k 20% of	 Holds k 10% of
Equity	 Equity	 Equity
% of Establishments	 2.50	 3.09
	
3.54
Total Establishments
	 7995
% of Employment	 6.19	 7.81
	
8.49
Total Manuf. Employment	 3479704
Table 2 describes the increase in foreign control over time, where the 10% threshold is the
indicator?' Table 3 describes the pattern, in 1980 and 1989, of foreign control across
industries. Foreign ownership is concentrated in the manufacture of chemicals, chemical and
petroleum products, petroleum refining, and in the primary metals and electrical equipment
industries. While the importance of petroleum to the Norwegian economy makes the pattern
of foreign ownership in Norway special, the chemical and electrical equipment industries are
certainly associated with a reliance on R&D and other intangible assets.
12 See Halvorsen et al. (1991) for documentation. NOS (several years), Manufacturing Statistics, reports some summary statistics.
13 In the summary statistics that follow, establishments identified as engaged in auxiliary activities and hence reporting no own
production have already been removed from the sample.
14 The increases in the numbers of foreign-controlled establishments from 1975-77 and 1985-87, which do not show up as
noticeable increases in employment under foreign control, may be due to increases in the coverage of small enterprises in the
survey of foreign ownership. Communication with Leiv Ryalen, Section for Finance and Credit Market Statistics, Statistics
Norway, March 14, 1994.
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Table 2. Foreign Control of Norwegian Manufacturing Establishments, 1974-89. (Using the 10% Foreign
Ownership Threshold)
Employment at 	 Total	 Plants under	 Total Plants
Year	 Plants under	 Employment
	
Foreign Control
Foreign Control (%)	 (%)
1974	 7.3	 362450	 2.3	 8413
1975	 6.9	 360428	 2.4	 8503
1976	 6.8	 359559	 2.2	 8414
1977	 8.9
	 359874	 2.9
	
8300
1978
	 9.5	 354394	 3.3	 8114
1979
	 9.7	 350106	 3.5	 8133
1980	 8.5	 347974	 3.5	 7995
1981	 8.4
	 341902	 3.5	 7936
1982	 8.3	 330186	 3.5	 7727
1983	 8.5	 306741	 3.7	 7218
1984	 9.1
	 302338	 4.0	 7141
1985	 9.6	 302516	 3.9	 7136
1986	 10.4	 302442	 4.5	 6994
1987
	 9.8	 301093	 4.7	 6936
1988	 9.5	 282025	 4.7	 6615
1989
	 10.2	 265069
	
4.9	 6507
Table 3. Industrial Distribution of Foreign Control of Norwegian Manufacturing Enterprises, 1980 & 1989
(Using the 10% Foreign Ownership Threshold)
Industry
Group
ISIC Code
Fraction of 1980
Employment at
Plants under
Foreign Control
(Total Empl.)
Fraction of 1989
Employment at
Plants under
Foreign Control
(Total Empl.)
Food, Beverages	 31	 4.0 (54564)	 7.6 (48189)
Textiles, Apparel	 32	 2.8 (20842)	 6.5 (9166)
Wood, Furniture	 33	 2.9 (30888)	 2.1 (22528)
Printing, Publ.
	 34	 5.1 (49012)	 5.4 (41605)
Industrial Chem.
	 351	 15.2 (9403)	 10.4 (7327)
Other Chemicals
	 352	 13.7 (7413)	 16.6 (5020)
Petroleum Refining
	 353	 57.4 (794)	 38.1 (1211)
Petroleum Products
	 354	 14.9 (1599)	 14.4 (771)
Rubber Products
	 355	 0.0 (1982)	 74.0 (1257)
Plastic Products
	 356	 9.3 (6752)	 11.9 (5674)
Stone, Clay, Glass
	 36	 4.4 (11641)	 20.9 (8323)
Primary Metals
	 37	 15.3 (26408)	 13.7 (18012)
Metal Products
	 381	 4.4 (24725)	 11.5 (20976)
Machinery
	 382	 8.3 (31568)	 8.6 (32361)
Electrical Equip.
	 383	 51.4 (20970)	 28.1 (16199)
Transport Equip.
	 3.84	 1.2 (45028)	 8.8 (22554)
Instruments
	 385	 1.0 (1297)	 10.1 (1619)
Other Manufacturing
	 39	 2.0 (3088)	 3.8 (2277)
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4. Performance of Foreign-Owned Establishments in
Norway
4.1. Characterizing Foreign-Owned Establishments
I selected a smaller panel of establishments to characterize differences between and compare
productivity performance of foreign-owned and acquired establishments with their
domestically-owned counterparts. Since the bulk of foreign ownership has been in the
chemical, petroleum, primary metals and machinery industries, I look at establishments that
list as their principal activity the production of goods in ISIC groups 35-38 (see table 3) • 15
Table 4 lists some characteristics of what I will call the "productivity panel." Only establish-
ments with more than five employees were included. Observations that were missing values
for the necessary input and output variables were eliminated, as were observations with
value-added per unit of labor and value-added per unit of capital more than three times the
interquartile range beyond the first or third quartile. Since I examine the productivity records
of establishments before and after control changes, I included only establishments in
continuous operation. Establishments that close and reopen years later comprise less than 2%
of the population. Establishments listed as providing auxiliary services had already been
removed from the larger sample used in section 3. The result is an unbalanced panel of
establishments in ISIC groups 35-38, including those that open or close during the period.
Table 4. Characteristics of the "Productivity Panel"
Item
Cohorts	 1974-1989
Number of Observations
	 33359
Number of Establishments
	 3851
Number of Establishments, 1974
	
1903
Foreign	 97
Number of Establishments, 1980	 2065
Foreign	 136
Number of Establishments, 1989
	
2165
Foreign	 180
Number of Foreign Acquisitions, 1975-89
10% threshold
	
197
20% threshold	 162
50% threshold
	
130
15 Klette (1991) uses data on establishments in ISIC group 38 from 1976-1985.
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Tables 5a & b report summary information about the foreign and domestically-owned
establishments in the panel, by two to three-digit ISIC for 1975 and 1989. Foreign-owned
establishments are, on average, larger than their domestically-owned counterparts and, in
most industries, more capital-intensive. The census distinguished between production and
white-collar workers through 1982, so I use the early data to describe the mix of labor used
by foreign and domestically-owned establishments. In this sample, foreign-owned
establishments tend to use more white-collar labor, and tend to make higher payments to both
labor classes.
Table 5a. Mean Size, Capital/Labor Ratios and Labor Mix in Domestic and Foreign-Owned Establishments,
1975
Value Added/	 Employees/	 Capital?
Industry
	 Establishment
	
Establishment	 Employee
Dom.	 For.	 Dom.	 For.	 Dom.	 For.
35	 9164	 23414	 82	 104	 258	 563
	
(31236)	 (50409)	 (204)	 (130)	 (179)	 (840)
36	 5268	 4898	 49	 62	 220	 298
	
(13510)
	 (2772)	 (88)	 (43)	 (173)	 (61)
37	 33021
	 91439	 254	 667	 264	 375
	
(53165)	 (95987)	 (451)	 (533)	 (170)	 (145)
381	 3692	 9023	 45	 104	 139	 200
	
(6762)	 (9839)	 (75)	 (99)	 (97)	 (85)
382	 5943	 9580	 64	 121	 133	 130
	
(13994)	 (9489)	 (135)	 (144)	 (94)	 (87)
383	 7043	 31713	 81	 295	 115	 151
	
(17035)	 (51495)
	
(154)	 (454)	 (111)	 (87)
384	 9478	 2908	 110	 29	 105	 189
	
(22913)	 (3299)	 (245)	 (29)	 (69)	 (121)
385	 1977	 30	 75
	
(1794)	 (28)	 (57)
Note: Table 5a continues on the next page.
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White Collar	 Production	 Fraction of	 Number of
Compensation' 	Compensation	 Prod. Workers	 Plants
Dom.	 For.	 Dom.	 For.	 Dom.	 For.	 Dom.	 For.
35	 61	 72	 46	 52	 .75	 .64	 258	 30
	
(16)	 (19)
	
(13)	 (13)	 (.16)	 (.16)
36	 58	 64	 48	 46	 .82	 .79	 199
	
(21)	 (13)	 (9)	 (5)	 (.11)	 (.11)
37	 70	 73	 52	 56	 .82	 .78	 76	 10
	
(11)	 (11)	 (8)	 (4)	 (.09)	 (.06)
381	 60	 68	 48	 52	 .83	 .76	 481	 12
	
(20)	 (17)	 (10)	 (17)	 (.11)	 (.11)
382	 61	 66	 53	 55	 .81	 .80	 308	 18
	
(18)	 (13)	 (11)	 (10)	 (.13)	 (.15)
383	 64	 69	 47	 47	 .75	 .69	 134	 23
	
(15)	 (11)	 (10)	 (9)	 (.17)	 (.19)
384	 62	 62	 51	 51	 .86	 .87	 381	 4
	
(18)	 (2)	 (10)	 (4)	 (.10)	 (.11)
385	 62	 49	 .80	 24	 --
	
(16)	 (10)	 (.13)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Nominal values represent N.kr.1000.
a The fire insurance values used to construct the capital stock measure have been smoothed using a perpetual
inventory method.
b Compensation is measured as total salary divided by the number of workers.
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Table 5b. Mean Size and Capital/Labor Ratios in Domestic and Foreign-Owned Establishments, 1989
Value Added/	 Employees/	 Capital/	 Number of
Industry	 Establishment	 Establishment
	
Employee	 Plants
Dom.	 For.	 Dom.	 For.	 Dom.	 For.	 Dom.	 For.
35	 21255 56215
	 63	 92	 1247	 2404	 255	 38
	
(66083)(123450)
	 (142)	 (130)	 (1498) (2754)
36	 9909 28470
	 32	 82	 1235	 1378	 183	 20
	
(19667) (33359)
	 (48)	 (81)	 (1301)	 (861)
37	 129362 198364
	 235	 259	 1909	 2261	 60	 9
	
(221743)(279226)
	 (283)	 (296)	 (1199) (1135)
381	 6045 18251	 27	 72	 526	 998	 593	 30
	
(9845) (24088)
	 (41)	 (88)	 (435) (1110)
382	 20309 19741
	 76	 65	 527	 480	 340	 35
	
(54251) (27740)
	 0(206)
	 (83)	 (406)	 (398)
383	 14006 40015	 49	 123	 551	 906	 183	 32
	
(24290) (54827)
	 (70)	 (173)
	
(554)	 (996)
384	 13509 38951
	 56	 146	 565	 830	 333	 13
	
(27074) (39727)	 (101)	 (151)	 (508)	 (465)
385	 7442 11279	 27	 27	 390	 479	 38	 3
	
(9360) (13140)
	 (30)	 (22)	 (331)	 (106)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Nominal values represent 1000 N.kr.
Table 6 explores whether the fairly dramatic differences between foreign and domestically-
owned establishments described in tables 5a & b are largely explained by industry and
establishment size. That is, I investigate first whether multinationals tend to locate in those
subsectors of the broad industry categories used above that are characterized by large plants,
higher capital per worker and greater use of human capital. Then I investigate whether,
controlling for industry, differences in capital per worker and use of human capital are
explained by size differences.
The entries in table 6 were calculated by performing variants of the following regression:
ln(CHAR) = a + P(FOWN10)
where CHAR is the value of the characteristic for the establishment, normalized by the
median for its industry/year or industry/year/size class cell, and FOWN10 is the foreign
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ownership dummy variable, defined using the 10% threshold. The coefficient P, then,
represents the percentage by which the foreign-owned establishment differs from its
domestically-owned counterpart, and conventional t-statistics can be used to test the statistical
significance of the differences.
Table 6. Are Differences Between Foreign and Domestically-Owned Establishments Explained by Industry and
Size?
3-Digit ISIC/
	
5-Digit ISIC/
	
5-Digit ISIC/
Characteristic	 Year Cells	 Year Cells	 Year/Size Class
Cells
Value-Added
	 .793 **	 .586 **	 .202 **
	
(.029)	 (.028)	 (.016)
Employees	 .663 **	 .499 **
	
(.026)	 (.025)
Capitalfa	 .242 **	 .141 **	 .112 **
Employee	 (.018)	 (.016)	 (.014)
White Collar"
	 .107 **	 .090 **	 .075 **
Wage (1974-82)
	 (.008)	 (.008)	 (.007)
Production	 .056 **	 .053 **	 .047 **
Wage (1974-82)	 (.007)	 (.006)	 (.006)
Fraction of	 -.067 **	 -.060 **	 -.040**
Production
	 (.007)	 (.007)	 (.007)
Workers (1974-82)
n	 33359
	
33359	 33359
n(1974-82)	 18346	 18346	 18346
Note: Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1 % level.
'The fire insurance values used to construct the capital stock measure have been smoothed using a perpetual
inventory method.
b Due to missing values, 16541 observations are used in the white collar wage regression, and 17971 in the
production wage regression.
I present a sequence of results using successively finer cells. The first column of table 6
compares foreign-owned establishments with domestically-owned establishments in the same
3-digit ISIC group and year. There are large, significant differences in size, capital per
worker, compensation per hour, and the mix of production and white collar labor. By
controlling at the 5-digit ISIC level, the regressions shown in the second column restrict the
comparisons to establishments engaged in more similar production. Although the differences
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between foreign and domestically-owned establishments diminish, as expected, establishments
with foreign owners are still distinctly different. Even within 5-digit ISIC categories,
foreign-owned establishments are more capital and human capital intensive. Finding that,
foreign-owned establishments are still different after tightening industry categories suggests
the intangible assets hypothesis; foreign-owned establishments seem not only to be clustered
in particular niches but to be unique within their niches.
The final column of table 6 controls for the effect of firm size. This is an attempt to further
tighten the comparison to establishments engaged in similar types of activities and to account
for the likelihood that domestic owners control most young, small establishments that,
because of their age, may be quite different from more mature establishments. I divide
establishments into four different size categories: less than 50 employees, 50 to 99
employees, 100 to 149 employees, and more than 150 employees. 16 Again, although
differences between foreign and domestic establishments diminish as the reference group is
tightened, large differences remain; foreign-owned establishments have approximately 11%
more capital per worker and pay production workers nearly 5% more, for instance!'
4.2. Comparing Productivity Performance
Sections 3.2 and 4.1 provide some tentative support for the intangible assets theory. Foreign
ownership does tend to be concentrated in industries that rely on investments in R&D and
marketing, and foreign-owned establishments appear to be unique even within fairly tightly-
defined niches. In the remainder of the paper, I search establishments' productivity
performance for confirmation that foreign-owned firms are reaping the rewards to intangible
assets. In this section, I present the basic production function framework within which
foreign and domestically-owned establishments are compared. In section 4.3, I investigate
how the measurement of capital and intermediate input may affect the comparison and, in
section 4.4, present the results.
Assume that all firms in an industry have technology that, at time t, can be described by the
16
 Since size class is defined over the number of employees, I do not calculate the comparison of the number of employees per
establishment in column 3 of table 6.
17 I use the same method to compare growth rates of sales and inputs for foreign-owned and domestically-owned establishments
and find no significant differences.
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production function Q = AitF,(;), where Q represents the output of firm i, Xit represents a
vector of inputs, Ft is the production function for all firms in the industry at time t, and Ait is
the productivity term.
Recent advances in methods of estimating production functions allow me to compare
productivity between foreign and domestically-owned firms without having to make
restrictive assumptions about competition, returns to scale, and the functional form of the
production function. I follow Klette (1993) closely; his model, which infers the marginal
productivities of variable factors from the first-order conditions of an optimizing firm, also
allows for differences in the quality of inputs used by different firms.
Klette describes how the production function can be expressed as logarithmic deviations from
a reference point, using a version of the mean value theorem. This approximation allows me
to avoid making restrictive assumptions about functional form and has the considerable
advantage of being appropriate even when there are large differences in the values of outputs
and inputs, as is usually true for cross-sectional comparisons between firms or establishments
and as is true for my "productivity" panel. I follow Klette in choosing the industry/year
median combination of inputs and output as reference point.
The production function expressed in terms of logarithmic deviations is:
+E 6-1;419	 j4,m,k
	 (1)
where lower-case letters with hats represent logarithmic deviations from industry/year
medians, the inputs j are identified as labor (1), intermediate inputs (m), and capital (k), and
a itj is the jth input elasticity for firm i in period t.
The input elasticities are estimated by two methods. The first-order conditions from the
profit-maximization problem of a firm that is a price-taker in input markets imply that the
input elasticity for each factor can be approximated by the product of the ratio of price to
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marginal cost (call this the markup) and the factor's share in total revenue.' Utilizing the
first-order conditions yields:
Îit=âittitE	 j4,m,k
	 (2)
where [t it represents the markup and s, the cost share for input j.
At this point, one can estimate the products of markup and cost shares directly or introduce
information about the cost shares, leaving only the markup to estimate. Using the cost share
information requires the additional assumptions of profit-maximization and price-taking in
input markets by firms, but it provides a method of introducing a degree of heterogeneity of
technologies between establishments. Previous work with similar production data
demonstrates that such heterogeneity is pervasive; the summary information presented in
section 4.1 reveals important differences between the foreign and domestically-controlled
establishments in my sample. °
 Allowing the elasticities to vary across establishments and
time also allows for some differences in the quality of inputs used. However, introducing the
cost share information may introduce additional measurement error.
The cost shares should be evaluated at an internal point between the reference point, the
median input/output combination for that industry in year t, and the input/output combination
for establishment i in year t. The bar above the s itj signifies that the cost share is evaluated
at this internal point. I follow Klette in using, as an approximation, the average of the
establishment's share and the median industry/time share.
I follow much of the literature in assuming that capital should be treated differently than
labor and intermediate input because it is likely to be fixed in the short run. I estimate
capital's share residually, first by imposing the assumption of constant returns to scale:
(3)
4it4it	 -4-itm(thit 4ACi)1*
18 See Hall (1990) or Klette (1993).
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 Cf. Griliches and Mairesse (1991).
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In addition, I relax the assumption of constant returns to scale by applying Klette's method of
estimating markups and scale economies simultaneously:
(4)
(lit -42U *l it	 lit	 4(qt-1)ki,
where o it
 represents the elasticity of scale.
To estimate (4), I must impose restrictions on pit and au. I assume the markup, or the
elasticity, is common within each of the eight industry categories and that there is a single,
common elasticity of scale. The variable definitions, in large part, rely on previous work
with these data by Griliches and Ringstad (1971) and Klette (1993). Revenue is defined as
gross production value, net of sales taxes and subsidies. The labor input is represented by
the number of personhours. Since only blue collar personhours are reported prior to and in-
cluding 1982, total personhours are estimated using the information on blue collar hours and
information on total wage costs for white and blue collar workers. After 1982, only the total
number of personhours is reported, and this is used to represent labor input. 20 Since I am
concerned about how the definitions of capital services and intermediate input affect the
comparison between foreign and domestically-owned firms, I discuss the two in detail in
section 4.3.
The productivity term, ait, is assumed to include foreign-ownership related factors that are
represented by a variable that takes the value one if the equity share of the largest foreign
owner is 10% or more, and zero otherwise. Unfortunately, there is good reason to expect
that a the disturbance of the production function, contains other components that are
correlated with the regressors. Marschak and Andrews (1944) suggested that, because
producers' knowledge of their relative productivities would be used in choosing input
quantities, the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) would lead to "simultaneous equations
bias." This problem is referred to as a "transmission bias" in the productivity literature, and
will tend to bias estimates of input and scale elasticities upwards.
20 The labor variable is "quality-weighted", then, only through 1982, with the weight assigned to white-collar personhours equal
to the establishment's average white-collar relative to average blue-collar wage.
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The usual first response to the transmission problem, suggested by Mundlak and Hoch
(1965), is to include a fixed firm effect. This also controls for omitted but fixed or slowly
changing differences between firms that may bias the OLS estimates, an advantage in most
cases. In my case, the advantage may be a disadvantage. Although foreign ownership is
only one source of fixed differences between firms, employing the fixed effects eliminates all
between-firm variation. After controlling for the fixed effects, identifying an effect of
foreign ownership on the level of productivity relies on those few firms that change
ownership status during the period.
There are other potential sources of bias. Approximating the cost shares, as was discussed
above, and ordinary measurement errors introduce the possibility of "errors-in-variables" bias.
Klette and Griliches (1992) show that using deflated sales or, equivalently, sales normalized
by industry/year medians as proxies for output may introduce an additional source of bias. A
firm-specific productivity advance may well cause a firm to lower price and expand output.
If firms have some ability to set price, using normalized or deflated sales will underestimate
the growth of output and hence underestimate the scale coefficient. 21 All of these problems
will tend to bias the estimate of the scale coefficient downwards.22
I take the following approach to the problem of estimating the foreign ownership effect in
the face of these potential pitfalls. First, I estimate the production function without fixed
effects but with an attempt to control for several possible sources of fixed differences
between firms or, in my case, establishments. I include dummies to control for the establish-
ment's region, whether the establishment is the main, secondary, or sole facility of the firm,
and whether the firm is organized as a corporation, partnership, single-owner firm, etc.
Second, I include the fixed effects dummies to explore how fruitful it is likely to be to
implement some of the techniques that have been suggested to control for these sources of
bias. After including fixed effects, one could proceed to instrumental variable estimation to
control for "errors-in-variables" and "transmission" problems. In addition, Klette and
21
 Klette (1993) also discusses this on pg. 35.
22 The comparison between domestic and foreign-controlled establishments may also be affected by a selection bias. If foreign
ownership or multiplant production allow more flexibility to close plants with inferior productivity, high productivity
establishments may be overrepresented among foreign-owned establishments. Since early results of research on exit behavior
by Klette and Mathiassen (1994, forthcoming) indicate that exit probabilities are not greater for foreign-owned establishments,
I do not attempt to correct for this potential source of bias.
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Griliches (1992) suggest reduced-form specifications to control for the problems involved
with using deflated or normalized sales instead of output. Much econometric technique could
be loaded on the problem; the question is whether the 197 establishments that change from
domestic to foreign status can bear the weight of all the technique. In the fixed effects
specification, two variables are included to capture a foreign ownership effect; the first takes
the value one if the establishment has changed from domestic to foreign ownership status
within the last one to three years and zero otherwise and, since organizational changes may
take time to implement, the second takes the value one if the establishment changed to
foreign status four or more years prior.
Finally, I adopt a pragmatic approach. I use the experience of Klette and others, with these
and similar data, to specify a range of reasonable markups and scale coefficients. I then
impose different assumptions on the production function and estimate foreign ownership
effects under this range of assumptions.
4.3 Two Measurement Issues: Rented Capital and Transfer Pricing
Although constructing input variables by weighting and aggregating different types of labor,
intermediate inputs and capital is typical in productivity research, I am concerned with two
instances in which aggregating, or rather aggregating with potentially incorrect weights, may
seriously bias the comparison between foreign and domestically-owned establishments. In
this section I discuss the implications of the possibility that foreign and domestically-owned
establishments may use rented and owned capital in different proportions, and of the
possibility that foreign-owned establishments engage in "transfer pricing," the internal pricing
of inputs or outputs transferred between the establishment and foreign affiliates at incorrect
prices to lower reported profits and taxes. I can use the productivity framework to quantify
the extent to which I have discounted rental capital. Although the problem of transfer
pricing is conceptually the same, the data do not exist to allow me to quantify the premia or
discounts attached to transferred inputs and outputs.
I construct an estimate of capital services that aggregates rental costs of capital and the fire
insurance values of plant and equipment, weighted by depreciation rates and rates of return to
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capita1. 23 In particular, I use the following aggregation:
(5)
Kit 4Z it i(0.07+8')V:4(0.07+8 )17:
where R it represents rental costs of buildings and machinery, ir (=0.06) and 8 1) (.0.02) are
depreciation rates for machinery and buildings obtained from the Norwegian National
Accounts, and V itm and V itt) are fire insurance values for machinery and buildings at the year's
end. The rate of return to capital that I have assumed, 0.07, is the discount rate used for
public investment in Norway and is within the range of estimates of the return to capital that
are found in productivity studies. Although these assumptions are subject to debate, I discuss
below how I explore their validity.
While using the cost share information and estimating capital's contribution residually allows
the shadow price of capital to vary across establishments and time, the aggregation of the
two types of capital may artificially fix weights. This may be a concern if foreign and
domestically-owned establishments tend to use the two types of capital in different
proportions or if, at the time of acquisition, establishments tend to shift from one type to
another (perhaps merely for accounting reasons). Although the data do not reveal important
differences between foreign and domestically-owned establishments in the choice of rented
and owned capital, there are frequent changes at the time of acquisition.
To explore the importance of this issue, I include a variable in the production function to
capture any "premium" (or discount) of rented over owned capital that was not captured in
the capital aggregate.' To see this, represent the capital services aggregate as:
(6)
Kit 4?it +Ilit
23 To reduce noise and avoid discarding the many observations that are missing values for fire insurance values, fire insurance
values of plant and machinery have been smoothed using a perpetual inventory method. Since I am concerned that
establishments that are acquired may, for accounting purposes, switch between owned and rented capital, I break the smoothing
at the year of acquisition. This is only an issue for the few establishments that are acquired by foreign owners.
24 This type of exploration was done by Griliches and Ringstad (1971), p.28.
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where R it represents all rented capital and V it all services from owned buildings and
machinery. Assume the true weighting of the rented and owned components of capital
services is:
(7)
Since the production function is in log deviations, the use of Kit instead of K implies that
the deviation of ln(1 + 1(R it/Kit) has been omitted from the specification, where ri is the
premium or discount associated with rented capital. This is potentially important here where
the fraction of capital services that is rented may be correlated with ownership. Expressing
(7) in log deviations and taking advantage of the fact that, since Ti is not likely to be large
and R it/Kit
 cannot be greater than 1, ln(l+n(R iliCit)) can be approximated by q(Rit/Kit), yields:
„
k:4c, t -ni (7 ) .
(8)
This suggests including the deviation of Rit/Kit from its industry/year median in the
production function to investigate the effect of the capital aggregation on the comparison
between foreign and domestically-owned firms.
The intermediate input variable is also an aggregate, with prices as weights. Some
intermediate inputs, including management or marketing services, may be produced within
the firm but outside of the establishment. In the case of foreign-owned establishments, some
inputs may be produced by parents or affiliates outside of Norway. If these inputs are priced
correctly in the data, the location of production is irrelevant. The census values inputs
produced outside of the establishment but within Norway at cost. Establishments are asked
to value management and other inputs obtained from a foreign parent or affiliate at market
prices. 25 Similarly, output sold to foreign affiliates is to be valued at market prices.
25 Communication with J. Stensrud, Section for Industry and Trade Statistics, Statistics Norway.
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If establishments find it easier to report internal accounting prices than to estimate market
prices, and if transfer prices differ systematically from market prices, my foreign ownership
comparisons will be affected. A foreign-owned establishment may appear less productive
than it actually is if transfer prices are manipulated to avoid Norwegian taxes. An establish-
ment may appear more productive than it is if transfer prices are used by a parent in a higher
tax country, say, to reduce taxable income at home by shifting income to Norway. If
shipments to and from foreign affiliates were recorded separately in the census, this issue
could be approached in the same way as the issue of aggregating rented and owned capital;
one could use the information to estimate the missing premia or discounts on transferred
inputs or outputs. Unfortunately, the Norwegian manufacturing census distinguishes only
shipments to and from domestic affiliates, so I am unable to control in this way for the
transfer pricing problem. There were, however, large shifts in the relation between the
Norwegian and the OECD average corporate tax rates over the period which may help to
detect whether significant manipulation of transfer prices has occurred. In the 1970s, the
Norwegian corporate tax rate was significantly lower than the OECD average. By 1985,
however, it had risen to more than two times the OECD average and remained relatively high
through the decade. 26
 Although for now I simply split the sample to look for differences in
results between 1974-82 and 1983-89, this is clearly an area in which I plan further
exploration.
4.4 A Foreign Ownership Effect on Productivity?
Table 7 presents the results of two sets of estimates of the productivity equation without
fixed effects. In the regressions presented in the top panel, elasticities are estimated directly,
without the use of cost share information; in the bottom panel, cost share information is
incorporated. In each panel, I present a sequence of regressions intended to successively
relax assumptions and test the input definitions. Separate labor and intermediate input
elasticities, or markups, are estimated for each of the eight ISIC industries. All variables are
measured as deviations from industry/year medians and dummy variables are included to
control for regional differences in productivity, differences related to the legal organization of
the firm (corporation, single owner, etc.), and differences related to the establishment's
26 Bachtler et al. (1991) report that while in 1975 the Norwegian corporate tax rate was 38 percent of the OECD average, by
1985 it had risen to 2.1 times the average. It remained high throughout the 1980s, falling sharply in recent years. Of course,
the relation of the Norwegian to the OECD average corporate tax rate provides only a partial picture of firms' incentives to
manipulate transfer prices.
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position in the firm (sole, main, or secondary facility). All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares.
Although the basic message of table 7 is that foreign-owned establishments appear to have a
productivity advantage of approximately 1.5 to 2.5 percent over their domestic counterparts,
foreign-owned establishments are also larger than domestically-owned establishments, and the
relation between size, ownership and productivity is yet to be unraveled. The estimated
productivity advantage of foreign-owned establishments survives different specifications, is
unaffected by the definition of the capital variable, and holds for a subset of larger
establishments. It also survives a large shift in Norway's corporate tax rate relative to the
OECD average that should represent a large shift in incentives to manipulate transfer prices
to reduce taxes. However, the magnitude of the estimated "foreign-ownership effect"
depends critically on the estimate of the scale elasticity, an issue to which I return below.
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Table 7. Estimates of Prodution Function Without Fixed Effects
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)
CRS	 Relax	 Test K	 >=50	 1974-82	 1983-89
CRS	 Mix	 Employees
Estimated Elasticities'
scale	 -.007 **	 -.005 **	 -.006 *	 -.006
(.001)	 (.001)	 (.003)	 (.002)	 (.002)
fraction of
	 .099 **	 .108**	 .099**	 .093 **
capital rented	 (.006)	 (.012)	 (.008)	 (.009)
fown10	 .013**	 .016**	 .015 **	 .015 *	 .011	 .015 *
	
(.005)	 (.005)	 (.005)	 (.007)	 (.007)	 (.007)
n 33352	 33352	 33352	 9850	 18343	 15009
R2
	.900	 .900	 .901	 .912	 .902	 .905
RMSE	 .204	 .204	 .203	 .187	 .201	 .200
Cost-Share Specification
1-135 	 1.12**	 1.12**	 1.12 **	 1.15**	 1.11**	 1.12 **
(.5) (.005)	 (.005)	 (.011)	 (.007)	 (.009)
P36 	 1.04**	 1.04 **	 1.05 **	 1.12**	 1.06**	 1.03 **
	
(.046)	 (.047)	 (.048)	 (.012)	 (.066)	 (.068)
1-137 	 1.10**	 1.11**	 1.10 **	 1.11**	 1.11**	 1.10**
	
(.010)	 (.010)	 (.010)	 (.015)	 (.013)	 (.015)
P381 	 1.08**	 1.09 **	 1.08 **	 1.08**	 1.08**	 1.09 **
(.6) (.006)	 (.006)	 (.008)	 (.011)	 (.005)
11382 	 1.07**	 1.07 **	 1.07 **	 1.09**	 1.07 **	 1.06 **
	
(.005)	 (.005)	 (.005)	 (.009)	 (.006)	 (.008)
P383 	 1.06**	 1.06**	 1.06 **	 1.07 **	 1.05**	 1.06**
	
(.007)	 (.007)	 (.007)	 (.014)	 (.011)	 (.009)
P384
	
1.04**
	 1.05 **
	 1.04 **	 1.04**	 1.05**	 1.04**
(.3) (.004)	 (.003)	 (.005)	 (.005)	 (.005)
P385
	
1.04**
	 1.05 **	 1.04 **	 1.12**	 1.08**	 .987 **
	
(.028)	 (.028)	 (.027)	 (.026)	 (.024)	 (.051)
scale	 .004**	 .005 **	 .020**	 .001	 .010**
(.001)	 (.001)	 (.002)	 (.002)	 (.002)
fraction of	 .079 **	 .105**	 .078**	 .078 **
capital rented	 (.005)	 (.010)	 (.008)	 (.007)
fown10
	 .023**	 .021 **	 .020 **	 .028**	 .024**	 .015 **
(.4) (.004)	 (.004)	 (.005)	 (.006)	 (.006)
n 33352	 33352	 33352	 9850	 18343	 15009
R2
	.927	 .927	 .928	 .935
	
.927	 .930
RMSE	 .175	 .174	 .174	 .160	 .174	 .172
Note: Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
a. The estimates of the elasticities are omitted to simplify the presentation, as are the parameter estimates for the
control variables. Dummy variables control for establishment's region, position within firm, and the legal
organization of the firm.
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First, consider the results in the top panel. In column 1, the assumption of constant returns
to scale is imposed. The foreign ownership effect is significant and indicates that foreign-
owned establishments
 are approximately 1.3% more productive than their domestically-owned
counterparts. When the constant returns to scale assumption is relaxed, shown in column 2, I
find slight diseconomies of scale. Since foreign establishments tend to be larger than their
domestic counterparts, the foreign ownership effect increases slightly. Column 3 reveals that
although rented capital is considerably undervalued in the aggregation I use, the use of
incorrect weights does not significantly affect the estimate of the foreign ownership effect. 27
Column 4 examines the effect of excluding small establishments, which are more likely to be
young and to be domestically-owned. This restriction, as well, has little effect. I return to
the discusssion of columns 5 and 6 below.
Introducing the cost share information, shown in the bottom panel of table 7, improves the fit
of the production functions. The ability to allow for differences in technology and in input
quality, the advantage of the cost share approach, almost doubles the foreign ownership
effect. I find that foreign-owned establishments have a productivity advantage of more than
2% over their domestic counterparts.' In this case, relaxing the constant returns to scale
assumption yields slight economies of scale. This, in turn, causes the foreign ownership
effect to decline slightly. This response and the response to relaxing the assumption of
constant returns to scale in the estimated coefficient regression in the top panel highlight that,
all else equal, when the estimated magnitude of the scale elasticity increases, the foreign
ownership decreases, and vice versa.
Column 3 of the bottom panel reveals, again, that aggregating owned and rental capital has
little effect on the estimate of the foreign ownership effect. In column 4, removing small
establishments causes the scale parameter, markups and foreign ownership effect to increase.
The finding of greater scale economies for the larger establishments is, admittedly, strange; it
27
 The coefficient of the capital mix variable estimates the product of the elasticity of capital and n , the omitted premium on
rented capital from (8) on pg.25. For illustration, assume the elasticity of capital equals .15 (this is consistent with findings from
other productivity studies); given this, the capital mix parameter estimates of .08 to .10 imply that ti ranges from .53 to .67.
These results indicate either that rental capital is internally priced by firms at a significant discount or that the rate of return to
owned capital is much less than I assumed in my aggregation.
28 For perspective, consider that Holmøy et al. (1993) estimated that, from 1971-1990, annual total factor productivity growth
in export-oriented Norwegian manufacturing was 1.9% and, in import-competing manufacturing, was 1.2%. Foreign-owned
establishments have, roughly, better than a year's advantage over domestically-owned establishments.
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is, however, confirmed by similar results in Klette (1993).29 The increase in the foreign
ownership effect is also surprising; if anything, I expected the foreign ownership effect to
shrink when the comparison was restricted to larger, more similar establishments.
Columns 5 and 6 contain the results of splitting the sample into two periods, 1974-82 and
1983-1989, to examine the stability of the estimated coefficients over time. There are at
least two important differences between the periods to consider: one involving the corporate
tax rate and foreign firms' incentives to use transfer prices to shift profits out of Norway, and
the other in the definition of the labor variable. Since the corporate tax rate in Norway
relative to the OECD average increased dramatically between the 1970s and the 1980s,
incentives to shift profits out of Norway by manipulating transfer prices should have
increased from the earlier to the later period. If firms do manipulate transfer prices, and all
else equal, this should show up as a decline in the productivity advantage of foreign-owned
establishments from the early to the late period.
The other change to consider is in the definition of the labor variable. Through 1982, labor
is to some extent "quality-weighted", since white-collar labor is assigned a weight equal to its
average wage relative to the blue-collar average. From 1983, labor is simply the unweighted
sum of blue and white-collar personhours. Since foreign-owned establishments tend to use a
larger proportion of white-collar labor than their domestic counterparts, the underestimate of
labor input in the later period is more severe for the foreign-owned establishments. They
should, as a result, appear relatively more productive. This problem is ameliorated in the
cost share formulation, since the labor elasticity of foreign-owned establishments will reflect
their greater expenditure on labor quality.
The regressions shown in columns 5 and 6 of the upper panel do not incorporate the cost
share information. In this case, the foreign ownership effect increases, if anything, from the
earlier to the later period. This may be due to the change in the definition of the labor
variable. The regressions shown in columns 5 and 6 of the lower panel do use the cost share
information, and indicate either a decline in the foreign ownership effect on productivity, or
an increase in the transfer of profits from Norway to foreign affiliates in response to the
increase in relative corporate tax rates from the 1970s to the 1980s. Note that a significant
29 Cf. Klette, op.cit., p.32.
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foreign ownership effect is still evident in the later period - the foreign ownership effect
survives an apparently large increase in incentives to transfer profits out of Norway.
Although the results of table 7 seem to provide strong evidence of a foreign ownership effect
on productivity, it is clear that the accuracy of the estimate of the foreign ownership effect
relies on the accuracy of the estimated elasticities and scale parameters. "Transmission," a
potential source of upward bias in the estimates of input and scale elasticities, could bias the
foreign ownership effect on productivity downwards. "Errors-in-variables" problems could
bias estimates of input and scale elasticities downwards and the foreign ownership effect
upwards. 3° As was discussed in section 4.2, the first remedy for the transmission problem
(but not the errors-in-variables problem) is to turn to a fixed effects specification; I present
the fixed effects results in table 9.
Before turning to the fixed effects results, I examine the productivity and size of those
establishments acquired by foreign owners during the period. Table 8 reports the results of a
probit regression of foreign acquisition on establishment size and relative productivity, as
well as industry, year, region and type.' I estimate the following regression:
FACQ1 O t = f(PROD t_2 , EMPt_ 2, PROD t_ 22, EMPt_ 22,YR, I, REG, TYPE)
where FACQ1 O t is a dummy variable taking the value one if the establishment is acquired by
foreign owners (defined using the 1 0% threshold) during period t and zero if not. PROD 2 is
the productivity residual from a cost share production function regression like that described
in column (2) of table 7, but without the foreign ownership term and control variables. It is
lagged two years to represent the establishment's performance before entering the transition
period around the acquisition.
EMP t_ 2 is the number of employees, included to represent size, and again lagged two periods.
Squared values of the productivity and size variables are included to explore the possibility
30 Cf. Griliches (1986), pp.1476-85. Griliches (p.1480) points out that the errors-in-variables problem is likely to be more serious
in the fixed effects specification, since eliminating much of the variance of the explanatory variables magnifies the noise-to-signal
ratio.
31 I compared the size, capital intensity and labor mix of foreign-acquired establishments relative to foreign-owned
establishments, using the method that was used for table 6. Differences were not significant at conventional significance levels;
if anything, though, acquired establishments are somewhat larger, and make less intensive use of physical and human capital,
than foreign-owned establishments.
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of nonlinear relationships. "YR" represents the set of time dummies, "I" the set of industry
dummies, "REG" the set of dummies describing the region of Norway, and "TYPE" the set
of dummies indicating whether the establishment is the main, secondary or sole facility of the
firm.
The probit results indicate that an establishment's relative productivity is not a significant
determinant of the probability of being acquired. I conducted a likelihood ratio test of the
hypothesis that the coefficients of both productivity variables equal zero. The results are
shown at the bottom of table 8a; the null hypothesis clearly cannot be rejected.' This is
useful information. Since establishments acquired by foreigners are of average productivity,
I can look for a foreign ownership effect by looking for foreign-owned establishments'
deviation from average after acquisition. If we can convince ourselves that foreign-owned
establishments are more productive than domestically-owned establishments, the results also
imply that foreign owners are actually adding productivity-enhancing skills or technology and
not simply acquiring more productive establishments.
3' Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic -2(1.4 1 -L0), where L 1 is the log likelihood value from the model estimated under the
constraint that the coefficients of the productivity variables equal 0, and I.,0 is the log likelihood value from the unconstrained
model, has a le,K- 1 , distribution.
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Table 8a. Probit Results: Are More Productive
	
Table 8b. Illustrative Foreign Acquistion Probabilities
Establishments Acquired by Foreigners?
	 Size Quantile	 Probability of
(Number of Employees	 Foreign
Variable	 in parentheses)	 Acquisition
PROD_2
	-.046	 Main Establishment of firm, in ISIC 383,
(.177)	 located in Oslo, in 1980
EMP_2 	.003 **
(.000)	 5 percent (7)	 .004
PROD_22
	.076	 10 percent (9)	 .004
(.466)	 25 percent (13)	 .004
EMP.22
	-2.53e-06 **
	 50 percent (26)	 .004
(6.18e-07)	 75 percent (67)	 .005
1977	 .439 **	 90 percent (166)	 .009
(.164)	 95 percent (326)	 .015
1978	 .293	 99 percent (921)	 .006
(.171)
1979	 .175	 ...in 1989
(.179)
1980	 -.010	 50 percent (26)	 .017
(.196)
1981	 .088
(.186)
1982	 .277
(.172)
1983	 .089
(.186)
1984	 .347 *
(.169)
1985	 .047
(.192)
1986	 .308
(.171)
1987	 .303
(.172)
1988	 .275
(.174)
1989	 .514 **
(.162)
ISIC35	 -.157
(.231)
ISIC36	 -.074
(.235)
ISIC37	 -.278
(.260)
ISIC381	 -.171
(.228)
ISIC382
	 -.112
(.229)
ISIC383	 -.239
(.241)
ISIC384	 -.406
(.239)
n	 25206
Pseudo-R2
	.0574
Likelihood Ratio Test for Significance
of Productivity Variables
X2(2) = 0.09
Prob > X2 0.9540
Notes: The dummies for 1976 and I5IC385 are omitted.
Data for 1974 and 1975 are used for the lagged series.
Dummy variables (not shown) also control for region and
type of establishment.
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The probit results indicate that an establishment's relative productivity is not a significant
determinant of the probability of being acquired. I conducted a likelihood ratio test of the
hypothesis that the coefficients of both productivity variables equal zero. The results are
shown at the bottom of table 8a; the null hypothesis clearly cannot be rejected. This is
useful information. Since establishments acquired by foreigners are of average productivity,
I can look for a foreign ownership effect by looking for foreign-owned establishments'
deviation from average after acquisition. If we can convince ourselves that foreign-owned
establishments are more productive than domestically-owned establishments, the results also
imply that foreign owners are actually adding productivity-enhancing skills or technology and
not simply acquiring more productive establishments.
The probability of acquisition increases with size to a point and then declines. To illustrate
the relationship between size and acquisition probability, table 8b. converts the probit
coefficients for the example case of a main facility of a multiplant firm, which is located in
Oslo and operating at an average level of productivity (relative to the entire sample) in the
electrical equipment industry in 1980. 33
Table 9 contains estimates of the production function using the fixed effects specification.
Control variables used in the production function regressions of table 7 are omitted; regional
and other differences in productivity are assumed to be captured by the fixed establishment
effect. The variable "acq13" is assigned a one if the establishment has been acquired by
foreign owners within the last one to three years; "acq4on" is assigned a one if the
establishment was acquired four or more years prior.
33 The estimated coefficients for the control variables not shown in table 8a are interesting even if somewhat tangential to the
goals of this paper. If, for instance, the 26-person establishment that has a 0.4% probability in any year of being acquired by
foreign owners were in mid to North Norway (Trondheim and north) instead of in Oslo, that probability would fall to 0.1%.
If the 26-person establishment in Oslo were the sole instead of the main establishment in the firm, the acquisition probability
would be 0.3%.
34
Table 9. Estimates of Production Function With Fixed Effects
(1)	 (2)	 (3)
CRS	 Relax CRS	 Capital Mix
Estimated Elasticities'
scale	 -.034 **	 -.035 **
(.004)	 (.004)
fraction of	 .080 **
capital rented	 (.007)
acq13	 -.008	 -.010	 -.011
(.009)	 (.009)	 (.009)
acq4on	 -.016	 -.019	 -.017
(.011)	 (.011)	 (.011)
n 33352	 33352	 33352
R2 	.950	 .950	 .950
RMSE	 .154	 .154	 .153
F(2,df)b 	1.13	 1.65	 1.38
	
(29485)	 (29484)	 (29483)
p-value
	 0.324	 0.193	 0.253
Cost Share Specification
P35 	 1.07 **	 1.06 -	 1.06 **
(.007)	 (.008)	 (.009)
1136	 1.01 **	 .989 **	 .995 as
(.048)	 (.050)	 (.051)
1137	 1.12 **	 1.11 **	 1.11 **
(.012)	 (.013)	 (.013)
P381 	 1.06 **	 1.05 **	 1.05 **
(.010)	 (.011)	 (.011)
P382 	 1.03 **	 1.02 **	 1.02 **
(.008)	 (.009)	 (.009)
P383 	 1.08 **	 1.07 **	 1.07 **
(.008)	 (.009)	 (.009)
1 384	 1.05 **	 1.04 **	 1.04 **
(.005)	 (.006)	 (.006)
P385 	 1.00 **	 .985 **	 .980 **
(.023)	 (.023)	 (.023)
scale	 -.023 **	 -.024 **
(.006)	 (.005)
fraction of	 .058 *1'
capital rented
	 (.007)
acq13	 -.003	 -.005	 -.005
(.008)	 (.008)	 (.008)
acq4on	 -.003	 -.005	 -.003
(.010)	 (.010)	 (.010)
n 33352	 33352	 33352
R2
	.960	 .960	 .960
RMSE	 .137	 .137	 .137
F(2,d0b
	 .08	 0.19	 0.19
	
(29493)
	
(29492)	 (29491)
p-value
	 0.919	 0.825	 0.827
Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
a The estimates of the elasticities are omitted to simplify the presentation.
b Degrees of freedom in parentheses.
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In all cases, the coefficients of the foreign ownership variables are negative, small and
insignificant.34
 The fixed effects results lend no support to the hypothesis that foreign
acquisition improves productivity. The F-tests listed below each of the regressions in table 9
refer to a test of the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of "acq13" and "acq4on" equal
zero. None the tests support a rejection of the null hypothesis. There are, however, only
197 foreign acquisitions during the sample period, too few, perhaps, to be confident that this
represents evidence against the intangible asset hypothesis. The limited number of
establishments changing status during the period make it questionable that adding more
complicated estimation techniques to control for various sources of bias would yield greater
insights.
The estimated magnitudes of markups and scale coefficients that emerge from the fixed
effects specification are lower than from the specification without fixed effects. If
transmission were the only concern, this would imply that the estimates of the foreign
ownership effect in table 7 are too low. But transmission is not the only concern, and the
errors-in-variables bias is likely to be more severe in the fixed effects formulation. So
comparing fixed effects with total regressions does not help determine the direction in which
the foreign ownership coefficients of table 7 are biased.
One way to proceed is to make use of the experience of Klette and others to specify a range
of reasonable assumptions about markups and scale elasticity, impose these different
assumptions on the data, and map out a range of estimates of the foreign ownership effect.
The results of such an exercise are presented in matrix form in table 10. I make two
assumptions about competition. First, in column 1, I assume the price/marginal cost ratio
equals one. Second, in column 2, I assume that the price/marginal cost ratio equals 1.20.
This is at the high end of the estimates of the markup that I have obtained, and that have
been obtained in extensive work with these data by Klette.
I make three assumptions about the elasticity of scale. First, in the top row of table 10, I
assume that there are quite large diseconomies of scale, that the deviation from constant
returns to scale equals -.10. This is at the low end of the range of estimates found by Klette
(1993). In the middle row, I assume constant returns to scale, and in the bottom row, I
34 I split the sample into early and late periods to perform the fixed effects regressions as well. Doing so yielded no interesting
differences.
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assume that the deviation from constant returns to scale equals +.10. Klette and Griliches
(1992) find such estimates of the scale elasticity from reduced forms that correct for the use
of deflated sales instead of output. In each cell, I present only the estimate and
(heteroskedasticity-corrected) standard errors of the foreign ownership coefficient from
regressions that differ from the cost share regressions of table 7 only in that the assumptions
about competition and scale have been imposed.
Table 10. Estimates of the Foreign Ownership Effect under Various
Assumptions about Competition and Economies of Scale
Markup	 11=1	 11=1.20
Scale
Coefficient
a=.90	 .073 **	 .072 **
(a-1)=-.10
	 (.005)	 (.006)
CRS	 .023**	 .022 **
a=1	 (.004)	 (.004)
0=1.10	.027**	 .028**
(a-1)=.10
	 (.005)	 (.005)
This table presents only the estimates and (heteroskedasticity-corrected)
standard errors for the foreign ownership coefficient from 6 cost-share
regressions like those presented in table 7.
When I impose constant returns to scale and perfect competition, the foreign ownership effect
is around 2%, similar to the results of table 7 (in which estimates of scale elasticities do not
deviate much from constant returns to scale.) Moving towards diseconomies of scale causes
the foreign ownership to increase dramatically. Moving towards economies of scale quickly
causes the foreign ownership effect to shrink and become negative.
Table 10 highlights the hazard of imposing constant returns to scale on the data to estimate
the foreign ownership effect. Assuming constant returns to scale when, for instance, there
are economies of scale, could lead to a false conclusion that foreign ownership provides a
productivity advantage. Within the range of estimates of the scale elasticity that emerge
from the literature, the foreign ownership effect takes a wide range of values.
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5. Conclusions and Extensions
My results suggest caution in interpreting foreign-owned establishments' productivity
advantage. Although I find that foreign-owned establishments are larger and more productive
than their domestically-owned counterparts, the relationships between size, foreign ownership
and productivity have not yet been unraveled. Until this is done, it is not convincing to
argue that the productivity difference is evidence that foreign owners are motivated by the
returns they reap from applying their intangible assets in Norway.
Over all, I find only mixed support for the intangible asset hypothesis. It does appear that
foreign-owned establishments are unique even within tightly-defined industries. The probit
analysis indicates that those establishments acquired by foreigners are of average
productivity. If combined with convincing evidence that foreign-owned establishments were
more productive, this could help strengthen the case for the intangible asset hypothesis. The
fixed effects results do not suggest any productivity improvement as a result of foreign
acquisition, but the number of establishments involved in a foreign acquisition during my
sample period is small. Lengthening the time series as new cohorts of data become available
will make the fixed effects regressions more informative.
The paper yields some practical guidance for future research. Adding the cost share
information, and thereby allowing technology and input quality to vary across firms,
increases the estimate of the foreign ownership effect. Aggregating owned with rented
capital has little effect on the estimate of the foreign ownership effect. Although the foreign
ownership effect appears to survive large shifts in incentives to manipulate transfer prices to
shift profits out of Norway, this is clearly an area that requires additional investigation.
Statistics Norway collects and compiles other information that could shed light on the
intangible assets hypothesis and, in particular, on the foreign ownership effect on
productivity. Firm-level information on R&D exits from 1975, and firm-level information on
advertising expenditures exists from 1986. Although these data measure only intangible asset
investments within Norway and not investments by foreign parents and affiliates,
incorporating information on intangible assets investments would control for some sources of
productivity differences that I have not explained and further refine the estimates of the
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foreign ownership effect. Comparing the expenditures on R&D and other intangibles made
within Norway by similar domestic and foreign-owned enterprises would be interesting in its
own right, since foreign owners are often charged with shifting such activities out of host
countries.
The intangible assets theory leads one to expect that establishments owned by other
Scandinavians will behave more like domestically-owned establishments than other foreign-
owned establishments. Since languages are similar, distances not great, and legal/regulatory
frameworks similar, the costs of entering the Norwegian market are not as great for these
firms. To the extent that tax rates are more similar within Scandinavia than between
Scandinavian and other countries, Scandinavian parent firms face less incentive to shift
profits through the manipulation of transfer prices. Although the data do not identify the
nationality of the single largest foreign owner, they do distribute total foreign equity holdings
by nationality, so differences in the behavior of Scandinavian-owned and other foreign-owned
establishments would be a fairly simple, and interesting, extension to explore.
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Appendix A: Statistics on Foreign Ownership of Equity in
Norwegian Enterprises - Statistics Norway's "SIFON-
registers"
Since 1919, Statistics Norway has conducted an annual survey of all Norwegian enterprises
or individuals known to hold foreign assets or liabilities. One of the outputs of this survey,
the "SIFON-register", which was initiated in 1972, is a unique and relatively unexplored
record of foreign ownership of equity in Norwegian enterprises. In principle, all Norwegian
enterprises with foreign equityholders are surveyed. Although in practice some small enter-
prises with low levels of foreign ownership may be missed, these enterprises account for
negligible amounts of employment or sales. 35 The register records only direct foreign owner-
ship. If, for example, an enterprise is owned wholly or in part by a Norwegian subsidiary of
a foreign firm, the "indirect", or once-removed, relationship between the enterprise and its
foreign owners will not appear in the register. A recently introduced system offers the
opportunity of recording indirect ownership relations from the 1990 cohort onward, but this
opportunity has not yet been exploited.
The register identifies enterprises by a code that enables the data to be matched to manu-
facturing, accounting, and other information collected by Statistics Norway. It contains in-
formation on the total book value of equity in the enterprise at year's end and the percent of
that equity held by the single largest foreign shareholder. It also lists the total value of
equity held by foreigners, and distributes that value into 24 different nationality groups. 3637
When the survey indicates that foreign ownership of equity in the enterprise has changed, the
register is updated, and the outdated record is saved in a historical file. Thus, although the
register is not organized as a panel, one can construct a panel of observations for each
enterprise in each year from the register's history. The file also identifies whether enterprises
that disappear from the "SIFON-register" have been dissolved, merged, or no longer have
significant foreign ownership.
35
 Communication with Leiv Ryalen, Section for Finance and Credit Market Statistics, Statistics Norway, March 14, 1994.
Increases in the coverage of the survey occurred from 1975-1977 and 1985-87. Currently, enterprises which have book value
of equity greater than or equal to 50000 NOK are certainly covered, and many smaller enterprises are also covered.
36 The information on total value of equity held by foreigners is the source of a foreign ownership variable reported in the
manufacturing statistics. The variable takes the value 1 if the foreign ownership share equals or exceeds 50%,2 if the foreign
ownership share equals or exceeds 20% but is less than 50%, and 0 if foreign ownership is less than 20%.
37
 From 1990, the "SIFON-register" also includes the market value of equity.
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